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Who uses financial reports and for what purpose? Evidence from capital providers 
 
Abstract 
We review the academic literature on the use of financial reporting information by capital providers. We 
classify our findings by investor type and by information objective. While most capital providers use 
accounting information, our survey indicates that they do so in a variety of ways with financial reporting 
information competing with other sources of information. We also find that information intermediaries 
are influential in both credit and equity markets, making the identification of a typical target ‘user’ 
inherently difficult. Our main findings question the underlying objective of the Conceptual Framework to 
guide the development of standards for general-purpose financial statements to provide a typical 
knowledgeable investor with a true and fair view about the reporting entity. Finally, we identify gaps in 
the literature and suggest areas where future research can help inform important academic and policy 
debates.  
 
Keywords: Capital providers; Conceptual Framework; Financial reporting information. 
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Who uses financial reports and for what purpose? Evidence from capital providers 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper surveys the literature on the use of information by capital providers. The existing Conceptual 
Framework explicitly states that financial reporting should be designed to reflect the needs of capital 
providers as the primary users of financial accounting information, yet some have expressed concern 
about the lack of academic research used to support standard setters’ assertions about user needs 
(Trombetta, Wagenhofer and Wysocki, 2012; Young, 2006). Moreover, recent debates suggest that the 
volume, dispersion and technical nature of empirical accounting research have contributed to a 
‘communications gap’ between standard setters and academic accounting research (Singleton-Green, 
2010) and that this gap may be difficult to address (Rutherford, 2011). Despite the significant volume of 
theoretical and empirical accounting research conducted in the last few decades, important questions 
remain largely unanswered.
1
 Attempting to summarize the existing evidence on capital providers’ use of 
financial accounting information and to identify potential (communication) gaps in the literature, we 
address the following three questions. First, who are the key capital providers of large European public 
companies? Second, what information objectives do these capital providers pursue? Finally, how do 
capital providers use information in general, and financial reporting information in particular? 
The recent discussion paper (hereafter DP) published by the International Accounting Standards 
Board on the Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2013) makes a systematic review of relevant literature 
particularly timely. The DP called for initial views and comments on virtually all the critical elements of 
accounting,
2
 and reopened the debate on fundamental and controversial issues, including subsuming the 
                                                 
1
 Research published in leading international accounting journals is sometimes perceived as technically sound, but 
relatively insular (Basu, 2012; Demski, 2007), focusing on narrow issues for where data availability is good, but 
where relevance for central accounting questions is low.   
2
 The major issues include: definition of assets and liabilities, recognition and derecognition, the distinction between 
equity and liabilities, measurement, presentation and disclosure, and other comprehensive income. 
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stewardship objective of accounting within decision-usefulness, the decision to replace reliability with 
faithful representation, and removing the concept of prudence from the Conceptual Framework. 
Answering the questions posed in the DP on the basis of existing evidence is far from 
straightforward. It requires an understanding of important interrelated issues, such as who the users of 
financial information are, how they use information, what decisions they are making, what fundamental 
characteristics of information are important, what alternative sources of information are useful to each 
class of users and how these sources relate to each other. While we cannot completely resolve all of these 
issues in our review, we place particular emphasis on the first two. In so doing, we examine the sources of 
information used by providers of capital to large European public companies, examining the use of 
financial reporting data in both valuation and in stewardship assessment decisions.  
We focus, where possible, on research providing ‘direct’ evidence of what capital providers do; i.e., 
on studies that provide primary evidence based on surveys, experiments and interviews, rather than on 
studies based on secondary/archival data. Our review is not confined to research published in the English 
language, though most of the evidence we cover is published in English.
3
 We also review how the 
information needs of various capital providers differ, considering the relationship between the valuation 
and stewardship roles of information. By focusing on the information needs of capital providers, we do 
not intend to imply that an accounting system solely designed for investors is necessarily socially 
desirable (Young, 2006). In addition, we recognize that not only is accounting shaped by the interests of 
capital providers, but also accounting regimes can influence capital structure (Bharath, Sunder and 
Sunder, 2008; Dhaliwal, Khurana and Pereira, 2011; Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam, 1999).  
We identify outside professional equity investors, outside private/retail equity investors, inside 
equity investors, public and private debt providers and trade creditors as the main capital providers for 
public European companies. Our primary conclusions are that there is significant variety in different 
capital providers’ information needs. Capital providers use accounting information in different ways and 
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 In particular, our search extended to studies published in French, German, Italian and Spanish. 
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their objectives when using different sources of information sometimes compete. Financial reporting 
information has distinct characteristics that set it apart from other information sources and is generally 
regarded as highly important for both financial decision-making and for contracting/stewardship 
purposes; however, it is by no means the only source. Moreover, information intermediaries are 
influential in both credit and equity markets, which makes identification of a typical target ‘user’ 
inherently difficult. 
Our findings imply that there is no clear prototypical user group on which standard setters can focus 
when developing standards. Also, capital providers use accounting information for different purposes, so 
it seems questionable whether a truly ‘general purpose’ financial accounting regime can exist. Finally, 
since financial accounting information is used in conjunction with other sources, it is not obvious that 
financial accounting should aim to present a holistic ‘true and fair’ view of the enterprise (i.e., a 
comprehensive assessment of the performance and financial position of the firm). Rather its design should 
exploit its competitive advantages: verifiability, objectivity, regularity and standardisation.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two briefly introduces the different 
capital providers and their heterogeneous claims and information needs. Section three reviews the prior 
literature on the information used by each identified major group of capital providers. Finally, section 
four discusses the findings and presents the conclusions, placing particular emphasis on the implications 
of our findings for standard setters and the development of the Conceptual Framework. 
 
2. Heterogeneity in claims and information needs across capital providers 
Prior research on the information needs of capital providers focuses predominantly on equity investors 
(Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010; Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001; Kothari, 2001;). However, on 
average, European countries have a debt market twice the size of their equity market, and debt is the most 
significant source of capital for the majority of European firms (Pagano and von Thadden, 2004). Indeed, 
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virtually all European companies rely on bank loans and trade creditors for capital and these jointly 
represent around 70 per cent of the total liabilities in the typical balance sheet. Other sources of debt - 
debentures, convertible debt and leases - are less significant. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The excessive concentration of prior research on equity market participants as the primary users of 
accounting information may lead to an incomplete understanding of the use of information by capital 
providers, both by academics and standard setters, since the evidence indicates that debt and equity 
providers may require different information and use it in different ways (Ball, Bushman and Vasvari, 
2008a; Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner, 2010). Because of differences in their importance, characteristics 
and information needs, we separately examine the evidence on different capital providers’ information 
usage, splitting them into equity investors, debt providers and trade creditors. Before we review the 
relevant literature, we briefly discuss how differences in claims may affect the information needs of 
capital providers and how they use information.  
2.1 Information usage and differences in claims 
In elementary terms, equity and debt can be differentiated by the basic feature that debt providers’ returns 
are limited on the downside and upside, whereas equity returns are only constrained on the downside. 
This gives different stakeholders different risk profiles and makes lenders and bondholders more sensitive 
to downside risk than equity providers.
4
 The interests of debt holders and shareholders may therefore 
conflict, particularly where shareholders and directors aim to maximize the value of shareholders’ equity 
rather than overall firm value.  
Shareholders may, for instance, design firms’ operations and financial structure in ways that increase 
equity value but which reduce both the value of the firm and its debt. This is known as the ‘agency 
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 Some studies illustrate this difference via comparisons with options, noting that shareholders’ claims are analogous 
to a call option on the value of the firm’s assets, with an exercise price equal to the face value of debt ( Beaver, 
Correia and McNichols, 2010; Kothari et al., 2010).  
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conflict of debt’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) and Smith and Warner (1979) identify four 
potential conflicts: 1) Dividend payments: when debt is issued, the price incorporates an assumption of 
dividend payments and if dividends increase, the value of debt is reduced; 2) Claim dilution: if the firm 
issues new debt of the same or higher seniority, the value of initial debt holders’ claim is reduced; 3) 
Asset substitution: if the firm issues debt to finance investment, the value of shareholders’ equity rises by 
substituting projects which increase the firm’s risk, whereas debt holders face a decline in the value of 
their claim; and 4) Under-investment: firms with outstanding debt may have incentives to reject projects 
with a positive net present value if the benefits from accepting the project accrue to debt holders. 
These conflicts generate predictable behavior from the different parties as well as differences in how 
they use accounting information. Moreover, debt holders protect themselves through higher interest rates 
in anticipation of such conflicts. To avoid this, shareholders are willing to incorporate covenants into debt 
contracts constraining the issuance of additional debt and restricting dividend payments or the acquisition 
and disposal of assets (Armstrong et al., 2010). Because the value of debt claims is generally more 
sensitive to decreases in firm value than to increases, debt contracts treat gains and losses asymmetrically: 
contracts usually include covenants triggered by falls in firm value, but not by increases. This potentially 
creates a stronger demand for conservatism in accounting from debt providers than equity providers. 
Furthermore, since many post-issuance contractual rights of lenders are specified in terms of financial 
statements alone, other sources of information are less valuable to them for contracting purposes. In the 
sections that follow we examine these issues in more detail. 
2.2 Financial decision making and stewardship roles 
Because of the recent revisions to the IASB Conceptual Framework, we consider both the ‘decision 
usefulness’ and ‘stewardship’ roles of information. Succinctly put, the former involves using information 
to make investment/valuation decisions and typically requires future-orientated information (that is, the ex 
ante role of information), while the latter entails using information to monitor management’s use of 
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capital after it has been invested in the company (the ex post role). This often requires more emphasis on 
past actions and often implicates key financial statement information (such as earnings per share or 
leverage ratios) explicitly in contracts between equity investors, managers and lenders. Although the term 
stewardship is used extensively, there is considerable discomfort about its use both by standard setters
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and by academics (e.g. Lambert, 2010); hence, the ‘contracting’ or ‘accountability’ roles are sometimes 
used as alternatives. Similarly, the ‘financial decision making’ role is sometimes referred to as the 
‘valuation’ or ‘decision usefulness’ role of accounting information. In this paper, we understand ‘decision 
usefulness’ as a general term, encompassing both the ‘valuation’/‘financial decision making’ role as well 
as the ‘stewardship’/‘contracting’ role of accounting.6 
The stewardship role of information receives far less attention in the literature than the financial 
decision making role (O’Connell, 2007). There is also much more empirical evidence on the role of 
information in financial or investment decisions, as much of the research on stewardship involves 
theoretical analyses. While there is no clear consensus on the relative importance of the two roles, there is 
serious concern over the relegation of stewardship in the Conceptual Framework (Lennard, 2007; 
Murphy, O’Connell and Ó hÓgartaigh, 2013; Whittington, 2008). In a study of the theory of standard 
setting, Kothari et al. (2010) argue that stewardship and performance measurement are the primary focus 
of financial statements, although Lambert (2010) challenges this view. There is a clear consensus, 
however, that while information for valuation is sometimes useful for stewardship purposes, the two roles 
are not always aligned (Bromwich, 1992; Lambert, 2001; 2010).  
In a seminal contribution, Gjesdal (1981) theoretically derives a demand for a stewardship 
objective for accounting and shows that the financial decision making objective and stewardship objective 
are not always consistent. Lambert (1993) also distinguishes between the valuation role of earnings and 
their role for evaluating managers’ performance and emphasizes the central point that financial statement 
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 The IASB was particularly concerned about the translation of stewardship into other languages (see IASB 2010, 
BC1.28). 
6
 Such an interpretation is not universal, however. See Scott (2011) for an alternative view where stewardship 
is not subsumed within decision usefulness. 
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information is useful for aligning investors’ and managers’ interest because unlike share prices (which are 
of primary concern to investors), accounting is not as affected by factors outside managers’ control. For 
stewardship purposes, capital providers value information if it is informative about managers’ effort 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert and Larcker, 1987); for financial decisions, however, information is required 
on future cash flows regardless of whether they are due to managers’ effort (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and 
Walther, 2010). Lambert (2010) notes that for financial decisions, investors use information for 
estimating future cash flows, while for stewardship purposes, they use the information to affect future 
cash flows. This is likely to affect the design of contracts to influence managers’ actions in the current 
period to be in line with the interests of shareholders (Kothari et al., 2010). Moreover, ‘the simple act of 
recording a steward’s exchanges creates accountability by causing her/him to modify her/his behaviour in 
light of this accounting’ (Dickhaut and McCabe, 1997, p. 61). 
Given these arguments, it should be unsurprising that the literature points to the desirable properties 
of accounting information differing under the two roles. In particular, conservatism is often preferred for 
stewardship and contracting purposes (due to a reluctance by managers to recognise bad news), whereas 
neutrality is usually preferred for valuation purposes (Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; Dutta and Zhang, 
2002; Kothari et al., 2010; Wu and Zhang, 2009). Dutta and Zhang (2002) also report that mark-to-market 
accounting is desirable from a valuation perspective, but not from a stewardship perspective because of its 
focus on anticipated managerial performance rather than delivered performance. Whereas for financial 
decision making, non-recurring items are inconvenient and are often removed from profit figures (Barker, 
2000; Barker and Imam, 2008), Christensen, Feltham and Şabac (2005) show that this is not always the 
case for stewardship. Importantly, however, both empirical market-based and theoretical studies report 
significant overlap between the stewardship and valuation roles (Banker, Huang, and Natarajan, 2009; 
Bushman, Engel and Smith, 2006; Drymiotes and Hemmer, 2013). In summary, the stewardship and 
valuation roles of financial statements overlap, but are far from identical, even for the same class of 
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investor. This supports the views of those arguing against omitting specific references to stewardship in 
the Conceptual Framework (e.g., see Lennard, 2007). 
 
3. Information usage by capital providers 
Following the above discussion, we review the existing evidence on information usage by different types 
of capital providers, starting with equity investors, followed by debt providers, then trade creditors. In 
discussing equity providers, we distinguish between professional (or institutional) equity investors, 
private (or retail) investors and inside equity investors. We also separate ‘inside’ equity investors (e.g. 
family owners) with access to private information about the firm from ‘outside’ equity investors, who 
have no such access and therefore rely on information that is usually publicly available. In so doing, we 
highlight potential implications of the literature for the current Conceptual Framework project. 
3.1 Outside professional equity investors 
Over the last three decades, the growth in institutional equity investment has been substantial. The 
average level of financial assets held by institutions in OECD countries rose from 110 percent of GDP to 
163 percent between 1995 and 2005 and equity represents the majority of these assets (OECD, 2008). In 
2009, institutional investors managed around $22 trillion of equity in the OECD area (OECD, 2011) and 
even in Germany, where bank finance traditionally dominates, professional equity investors are now 
highly influential in investment and governance processes (Hewitt, 2011).  
The literature largely ignores differences between institutional investor types (pension funds, 
insurance companies and investment funds), but does distinguish between fund managers (those 
responsible for investment decisions) and equity analysts (information intermediaries in the professional 
equity investment market; e.g., Barker, 1998). Equity analysts comprise sell-side analysts and buy-side 
analysts: the former are usually employed by investment banks and produce earnings forecasts, stock 
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recommendations and target prices, while the latter work in investment management firms and use 
information from sell-side analysts and elsewhere to support their portfolio investment decisions (Fogarty 
and Rogers, 2005; Schipper, 1991). 
Professional equity investors’ main aim is to maximize risk-adjusted stock returns relative to a 
benchmark or index and assess whether shares are over/undervalued with reference to uncertain future 
cash flows or earnings (Arnswald, 2001; Barker, 1999a). They therefore require information for 
estimating future cash flows and/or earnings and associated risk (or future returns). Such investors also 
have important stewardship assessments to make in holding managers to account for past performance. 
Accounting information that is not future-orientated may therefore be useful for management appointment 
and remuneration decisions (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997). 
Much of the survey evidence in this field is now dated, but there is significant consistency across 
studies. First, professional equity investors employ fundamental valuation models - particularly the 
price/earnings (P/E) ratio and, more recently, discounted cash flow (DCF) models (Barker, 1998; 1999b; 
Imam, Barker and Clubb, 2008). Second, across many countries, they are heavily reliant on financial 
statements. This is the case in France (Chambost, 2007); Germany (Ernst, Gassen and Pellens, 2005; 
2009; Gassen and Schwedler, 2010; Glaum and Friedrich, 2006; Marton, 1998; Pike, Meerjanssen and 
Chadwick, 1993); the Netherlands (Vergoossen, 1993); Spain (Rojo Ramírez and García Pérez de Lema, 
2006); Sweden (Olbert, 1994) and the UK (Campbell and Slack, 2008; Clatworthy and Jones, 2008; 
Imam et al., 2008). Third, direct contact with company personnel is very influential and sometimes more 
important than financial reporting data (Barker, 1998; Barker, Hendry, Roberts and Sanderson, 2012; 
Glaum and Friedrich, 2006; Holland, 1998). There is little consensus on the relative importance of other 
information sources, however. The fact that professional equity investors use multiple alternative 
information sources besides financial statements suggests the Conceptual Framework should 
acknowledge financial reporting as one of many information sources. This may lead to the development 
of financial reporting based on on the competitive advantages of the financial accounting process. 
10 
 
Use of valuation models 
One of the reasons accounting information is so widely used by professional equity investors is the 
prevalence of valuation models or heuristics that use accounting data as inputs. The most prominent 
models in the theoretical accounting literature are the residual income valuation model (Feltham and 
Ohlson 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Peasnell, 1982) and, more recently, the abnormal earnings growth model 
(Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). Both have accounting foundations: the former being based on the 
book value of equity, abnormal earnings and growth in book value of equity, and the latter being 
anchored on the price/earnings ratio and abnormal earnings growth (Penman, 2010). 
Early evidence (Pike et al., 1993; Vergoossen, 1993; Barker, 1999a) shows the Price/Earnings ratio 
is widely used by analysts and fund managers, with DCF models being less influential. However, more 
recent evidence shows DCF models are used more than earnings models, particularly in growth industries 
(Demirakos et al., 2004; Glaum and Friedrich, 2006). Based on equity research reports and interviews 
with sell-side and buy-side analysts, Imam et al. (2008) find DCF models to be more important than early 
research suggests. Valuation models are not used mechanically and are often employed on a relative, 
rather than an absolute basis. Glaum and Freidrich (2006) find that UK and German telecommunications 
analysts use multiples to compare with other firms and to prompt further investigation of within-industry 
differences. Hence, models often represent an initial screening device (Barker, 1999b) used to 
communicate earnings valuations efficiently (Imam et al., 2008). The widespread use of valuation models 
indicates that changes in recognition and measurement rules may well affect the outcome of such 
valuation exercises. This becomes relevant for standard setters if professional investors fail to adjust their 
valuation techniques to rule changes and supports the importance of cross-sectional and cross-temporal 
comparability of financial accounting information. 
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Information sources used by professional equity investors 
European surveys show that the financial statements, and direct company contact are important to 
professional equity investors. The income statement is perceived as most useful, while management 
contact is most important overall (Gassen and Schwedler, 2010; Ernst, Gassen and Pellens, 2009). Recent 
international comparisons are rare and tend to reinforce these conclusions, though Ernst et al. (2005), find 
that Anglo-Saxon investors focus more on cash flow statements than German investors.  
A limitation of the survey evidence is its assumption that information sources are used 
independently. Financial reporting information is used in conjunction with other sources, particularly 
management contact (Holland, 1999; Marton, 1998). Barker et al. (2012, p. 219) find that management 
meetings are used to ‘frame or make sense of the plethora of hard data provided by the companies 
themselves and by analysts’ and even though management discussion covers information outside the 
financial statements (e.g. strategic information and managers’ ability to implement strategy - Glaum and 
Friedrich, 2006; Roberts, Sanderson, Barker and Hendry, 2006), management meetings would be less 
informative without audited financial statements. Non-accounting information is important to professional 
equity investors, but is used to add meaning to more verifiable accounting data (Barker and Imam (2008). 
Standard setters therefore need to consider the perceived strengths of accounting by investors. 
The importance attached to information sources sometimes appears to transcend economic 
considerations. In a study of UK fund managers, Barker et al. (2012) report that management meetings 
provide information that is useful, but not price sensitive. Fund managers use meetings to develop 
personal relationships, to acquire tacit knowledge and to form subjective opinions of managements’ 
capabilities, not merely to acquire short-term value-relevant information. 
Various surveys show that the notes to financial statements are important to professional equity 
investors (e.g., Clatworthy, 2005; Fülbier, Niggemann and Weller, 2008; Gassen and Schwedler, 2010; 
Marton, 1998; Olbert, 1994), but the extent to which professional investors conduct detailed analyses of 
accounting data seems surprisingly low (Barker, 2000; Breton and Taffler, 1995). In addition, analysts’ 
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interpretation and use of earnings information is not always based on a complete understanding of 
accounting issues of recognition and measurement. Lachmann, Wöhrmann and Wömpener (2011) find 
that German investors are misled by fair value accounting for liabilities; interestingly, however, Nelson 
and Tayler (2007) report that disclosures in notes are not given the same degree of importance as 
recognized figures but when analysts go through the process of adjusting the footnote data as if it were 
recognized, they attach greater weighting to it. These findings seem to be particularly relevant for 
conceptual standard setting debates about recognition, measurement and disclosure as they show that the 
choice to disclose certain information in the notes or to recognized it on the face of the financial 
statements is important. In addition, they suggest that there is a limit to the level of complexity that can be 
reasonably imposed on even the most sophisticated users of financial reporting data. 
The extensive related literature on sell-side analysts mainly focuses on earnings forecasts. Studies 
report that analysts fail to incorporate all publicly available information in their forecasts (Abarbanell and 
Bernard, 1992; Lys and Sohn, 1990) and are prone to over- and under-reaction (DeBondt and Thaler, 
1990; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). European evidence is generally consistent with US findings (Capstaff, 
Paudyal and Rees, 1995; 1998; Hodgkinson, 2001; Wallmeier, 2005) but there is unsystematic variation 
between European countries (Capstaff et al., 2001). Analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic on 
average, which is often attributed to them maintaining good relationships with management and to 
investment-banking ties between issuers and analysts’ employers (Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 
1998; Groysberg, Healy and Maber, 2011; Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Lim, 2001; Lin and McNichols, 
1998; O’Brien, McNichols and Hsiou-Wei, 2005). Analysts also produce biased recommendations and 
target prices on average (Bradshaw, 2011; Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal, 2009), but despite 
this, professional investors still rely on analysts’ outputs (Barker, 1998; Clement and Tse, 2003) and are 
well aware of potential biases (Clatworthy, 2005). Brown (1993), Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) and 
Bradshaw (2011) provide comprehensive reviews of the sell-side analysts’ literature. 
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Turning to specific recognition and measurement rules, theoretical studies (e.g. Callen, 2009; 
Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Walker and Wang, 2003) indicate that transient profits are less highly valued 
than persistent profits. Accordingly, other comprehensive income is less relevant to analysts than net 
income (Mechelli and Cimini, 2014; Thinggaard et al., 2006) and analysts find ‘pro-forma’ earnings 
useful because they exclude transient items (Gu and Chen, 2004). Experimental research suggests pro-
forma earnings may mislead professional analysts (Andersson and Hellman, 2007) while buy-side and 
sell-side analysts from Germany, Spain and the UK rely on EBITDA - earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (Clatworthy and Jones, 2008; Glaum and Friedrich, 2006; Martinez Conesa 
and Ortiz Martinez, 2004).  
Empirical evidence on professional investors’ views of accounting valuation bases is scarce. Gassen 
and Schwedler (2010) find a preference for fair value for liquid non-operating assets when based on 
mark-to-market, but not for non-liquid operating assets. Such a conclusion is consistent with the theory of 
Hitz (2007), who concludes that fundamental problems with the validity of fair value are most 
pronounced for model-based valuations. Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) demonstrate that mark-to-market 
accounting is theoretically most problematic when assets are long-lived, illiquid, and senior. 
Why then are financial statements considered useful when they are published infrequently and are 
less timely and less future-orientated than other sources, such as analysts’ forecasts and information from 
company personnel? Analysts appear to recognise these limitations of accounting data (Campbell and 
Slack, 2008; Glaum and Friedrich, 2006) and emphasize the importance of the annual report as a 
reference document, both as the basis for forecasts of future earnings, and for resolving uncertainty about 
the present and recent past (Marton, 1998). Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that earnings provide little 
new information to stock markets, and have more of a ‘disciplining’ or verification role of confirming 
prior information. Beyer et al. (2010) find that US mandatory accounting information explains a low 
proportion of equity returns, but represents a ‘benchmark’ against which more timely and relevant 
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disclosures can be assessed. Whether accounting information is less influential than other information 
sources is, however, strongly contested by Basu, Truong Xuan Duong, Markov and Tan (2013).  
Professional equity investors’ use of information to assess stewardship  
Empirical research into professional equity investors’ use of information for assessing stewardship is 
sparse. Most studies examine the use of accounting data in executive compensation contracts, recognising 
that accounting information is sometimes preferable to share prices for assessing management 
performance and captures managers’ effort better (Lambert, 2001). Accounting information is used 
extensively for compensation (Bushman and Smith, 2001; O’Connell, 2007; Sloan, 1993), but reliance on 
share-based compensation and option plans may have reduced the association between pay and earnings 
(Core, 2002). The definition of earnings used is unclear, but Lambert (2010) conjectures that few 
contracts use ‘bottom line’ earnings. Ozkan, Singer and You (2012) report a stronger relationship between 
earnings and compensation for European countries after the introduction of IFRS.  
A primary purpose of UK management meetings with professional equity investors is holding 
company management to account and monitoring financial performance (Roberts et al., 2006). Hence, 
Barker (1998) finds that UK fund managers use accounting information in meetings with management to 
assess their performance track record, while Holland (1999) finds that financial statements are used in 
assessments of performance relative to previous year’s objectives.  
Overall, professional equity investors rely on accounting information and management contact for 
investment and for stewardship purposes, but the literature lacks recent evidence, particularly for 
stewardship assessment decisions. There is also relatively little evidence on investors based in European 
countries outside the UK. What little evidence there is on stewardship points to professional investors 
using accounting information for monitoring and control purposes, further strengthening the case for a 
more prominent role for stewardship in the Conceptual Framework.  
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3.2 Private/retail equity investors 
Retail investors use public media, advice by financial institutions, friends or family, and financial 
statements as information sources for their decisions as capital providers. Early research by Anderson and 
Epstein (1996), Epstein and Pava (1993), and Lee and Tweedie (1975) reveals a preference for financial 
advice by brokers and other financial institutions, whereas more recent evidence shows that public media 
plays a major role (Ernst et al., 2005; 2009; Pellens and Schmidt 2014). Both sources provide ‘filtered’ 
information, where the underlying accounting information has been selected, condensed and interpreted. 
A survey of US investors by Elliott, Hodge and Jackson (2008) indicates that the use of unfiltered, ‘raw’ 
financial accounting information by retail investors is linked to lower returns on investment, particularly 
for less experienced investors. Accordingly, more experienced and better-educated retail investors rely 
relatively more on unfiltered quantitative information (Ernst et al., 2009; Elliot et al., 2008).  
With respect to financial statements retail investors focus on the balance sheet, the income statement 
and (to a lesser extent) the cash flow statement and seem to discard the notes to the financial statements 
almost entirely (Ernst et al., 2009: 31).  There is also evidence that retail investors prefer audited to non-
audited information (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath and Wood, 2011; Ernst et al., 2009; Hodge, Hopkins 
and Wood, 2010). Overall, retail investors recognise the agency problems related to their investment: 
around 50 percent assume that managers manage earnings opportunistically (Hodge, 2003. p. 42). Also, 
Ernst et al. (2009, p. 43) show that more than 40 percent fear being exploited by other stakeholders. This 
view is more pronounced among inexperienced investors. 
Experimental evidence indicates that retail investors tend to ignore relevant information even if it is 
targeted at their needs and provided free of charge (Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos and Meyer, 
2012). In addition, they are more easily misled by pro-forma earnings disclosures and often use overly 
simplistic valuation models (Elliot, 2006; Frederickson and Miller, 2004). As is the case for professional 
investors, accounting presentation matters for retail investors’ information analysis and different weights 
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are assigned depending on location in the financial statements (Hodge et al., 2010; Lachmann et al., 2011; 
Maines and McDaniel, 2000). 
Archival evidence generally finds that retail investors fail to incorporate available financial reporting 
information when making investment decisions. Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) show that retail 
investors systematically under-estimate the implication of earnings announcements for future earnings. 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) report that retail investors fail to adjust bias in analysts’ 
recommendations. Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers and Teoh (2008), using personal trade data provided by a 
discount broker, document that retail investors tend to be net buyers around earnings announcements with 
extreme earnings surprises, regardless of whether these surprises are positive or negative. Finally, 
Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong and Wood (2004) find that retail trading increased relative to 
institutional trading around earnings announcements after Regulation Fair Disclosure was introduced in 
the US, consistent with retail investors abstaining from trading when they fear institutional investors have 
better information. Similarly, Lawrence (2013) provides evidence based on brokerage data that retail 
investors invest more and obtain higher returns in firms with more detailed and more readable annual 
reports and that these associations are less pronounced for investors with a professional background. 
There is some evidence that private investors use financial statements and the annual report for 
stewardship assessment purposes. In a study of Swedish annual general meetings, Carrington and Johed 
(2007) find that private shareholders are often concerned with financial accounting issues, management 
compensation and past performance of the firm. Consequently, financial statement-related issues seem to 
form an important part of the dialogue at the annual general meeting.  
In summary, retail investors prefer filtered information provided to them by information 
intermediaries (financial advisors and public media) to unfiltered information. Limited information 
processing capabilities and behavioural biases explain sub-optimal demand for and processing of 
information. The fact that reducing information asymmetries between investor types causes increased 
trading by retail investors (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) suggests that poorly informed retail investors lead 
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to lower liquidity. This latter finding may motivate standard setters and regulators to also focus on the 
divergent information needs of retail investors and their intermediaries when developing standards. 
3.3 The use of accounting information by inside equity investors 
In many European countries, large public companies have significant levels of inside equity investment. 
Inside investors are equity investors with an active involvement in company management.
 
The most 
common type of inside investors is entrepreneurial families. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
family firms are very common: even in the US, around 33 percent of the largest firms are companies 
where founding families are blockholders and control a considerable portion of board seats.  
 Salvato and Moore (2010) provide a concise survey of the role of accounting information in 
family firms, highlighting important peculiarities that distinguish families and inside investors from other 
investor types in their use financial reporting information. The overlap of ownership and control 
characterizing family firms means that inside investors are simultaneously users and producers of 
financial reporting information. Because of their incentive structure and investment horizon, inside 
investors have specific information needs that require accounting information to be useful for managerial 
control, executive compensation and strategic planning. 
Direct evidence for these information needs is scarce as research predominantly focuses on the 
information production by inside investors. A rare study providing survey evidence is Upton, Teal, and 
Felan (2001), which documents, based on a survey of high-growth family firms, that financial reports are 
prepared with a clear intention to tie the information to written formal plans. Inside investors therefore 
primarily require a sufficient level of detail to link strategic planning to actual performance and to connect 
management compensation with financial results (Tiscini and Raioli, 2012).  
These limited insights into the use of information by inside equity investors nevertheless highlight a 
very important aspect that may also generalize to firms that are manager-run: financial accounting 
information is often useful for internal decision-making. This use tends to be overlooked by standard 
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setters and also seems to play only a minor role in the current debates around the Conceptual Framework. 
However, especially in settings where managerial accounting and internal reporting systems are 
underdeveloped, like in firms operating in developing and emerging economies and in smaller entities, 
financial accounting may perform a highly influential role in guiding business decisions. The lack of 
attention paid to inside capital providers perhaps reflects – as does the Conceptual Framework – that in 
determining how user demands shape financial reporting, one needs to consider not just the amount of 
capital provided by different user groups, but also the ability of users to require entities to provide 
information directly to them. 
3.4 Public and private debt providers 
Existing research suggests debt providers are sophisticated users of financial statements data, and that 
accounting is used extensively for assessing financial distress and in debt contracting. This holds both for 
public (e.g., bonds) and private debt (e.g., individual or syndicated bank loans) and so, to simplify, we do 
not distinguish between them in this review. However, as explained in Bharath et al. (2008) and 
summarized in Table 2 there are important differences between these types of financing. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In private lending, lenders have superior information-processing abilities and better access to private 
information, which can be used both in designing the contract and in subsequent monitoring 
(Bhattacharya and Chisea, 1995; Fama, 1985). In addition, co-operation among private lenders is easier, 
resulting in more effective monitoring (Diamond, 1984; 1991). Accounting information is therefore more 
important for public debt issues. In private borrowing, where firms often develop relationships with their 
lenders, financial intermediaries can obtain information from other sources and from repeated 
interactions, thereby reducing the value of accounting.  
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The use of accounting information to predict financial distress and credit ratings 
Debt investors are particularly interested in assessing financial distress to decide how much to lend, and 
on what (price and non-price) terms. Much evidence exists on the usefulness of financial statement data to 
predict financial distress, although there is no clear unifying theory. The early work of Beaver (1966) 
suggests up to 30 ratios in six categories: cash flow; income; debt to total assets; liquid assets to total 
assets; liquid assets to current debt; and turnover ratios. Subsequent research confirms the usefulness of 
accounting ratios in predicting distress (Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001; Taffler, 1983; 
Zmijewski; 1984). Beaver et al. (2005, 2010) summarize this literature and show that the three key ratios 
are: 1) ROA (profitability of assets); 2) EBITDA to total liabilities (ability of cash flow to service the 
payments); and 3) Total liabilities to total assets (a measure of assets available to repay debt).  
Alternative approaches to predicting financial distress using option pricing theory also exist (e.g., 
Black and Scholes, 1973). These studies use market value-based variables,
7
 and challenge the accuracy of 
accounting models on the grounds that distress prediction is concerned with the likelihood of future 
events and financial statements measure past performance, are formulated under the going-concern 
principle (limiting their ability to assess distress), are less timely than other sources of information and do 
not provide estimates of volatility. Which models perform best is still unresolved (Campbell et al., 2008; 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt, 2004), but the work of Beaver et al. (2010) suggests that the 
information not reflected in accounting adds little explanatory power. 
A related literature studies bond/credit analysts. These analysts collect and interpret information 
about public corporate bond securities, ultimately providing recommendations. Prior research shows that 
accounting data can predict credit ratings reasonably well (Horrigan, 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; 
West, 1970). In fact, simple models using as explanatory variables return-on-assets, debt-to-assets, firm 
size, dividend payment, and indicators on whether the firm has subordinated debt or negative ROA, can 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Bharath and Shumway (2008), Campbell et al. (2008), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Hillegeist et al. (2004); 
Vassalou and Xing (2004). 
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explain up to 66 per cent of the cross-sectional variation in S&P credit ratings (Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman, 1998; Barth, Hodder and Stubben, 2008). This suggests that accounting information is a major 
input, but also that credit analysts gather other information (Graham, Maher, and Northcut 2001; Jorion, 
Liu and Shi, 2005; Lee, 2002).  
There is very little research into how properties of accounting affects credit analysts. The limited 
available evidence suggests they adjust accounting figures by incorporating off balance-sheet financing 
(Kraft, 2011), but they sometimes fail to incorporate all accounting information into their 
recommendations, particularly for taxes (Ayers, Laplante, and McGuire, 2010), or asset securitizations 
(Barth, Ormazabal and Taylor., 2012). Overall, credit analysts seem to prefer predictable earnings 
(Crabtree and Maher, 2005) and demand negative information more than positive information (De 
Franco, Vasvari and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009; Easton, Monahan and Vasvari, 2009), consistent with 
the well-established Merton (1974) finding that the sensitivity of debt to changes in the value of the 
company’s assets increases when the company is in financial distress. Taken together, these findings lend 
support to an emphasis on bad news indicators and earnings predicatbility when developing the 
Conceptual Framework. 
The use of accounting information in debt contracts 
Audited accounting information plays a crucial role in debt contracting, both at the time of the initial 
provision of capital and during subsequent renegotiations (Smith and Warner, 1979; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). Many features of debt contracts can be affected by accounting attributes or require 
accounting data in their calculations.
8
 Research unequivocally demonstrates that financial covenants 
based on accounting variables are commonly used in debt contracts (Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Beneish 
and Press, 1993; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Leftwich, 1983; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009), particularly 
                                                 
8
 These include: the interest rate; loan size and maturity; level of collateral; the presence and nature of performance-
pricing provisions; financial covenants; restrictions on investment; dividend and the borrowing base; and whether 
(‘frozen GAAP’) or not (‘rolling GAAP’) the accounting principles used are fixed at loan initiation (Armstrong et 
al., 2010). 
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when agency conflicts are high and there is a risk that debt-holders’ investment will be expropriated, such 
as in small, high-growth firms (Billet, King and Mauer, 2007) and where leverage is high (Citron, 1992a). 
On average, debt contracts contain around three financial covenants (Ball et al., 2008a; Christensen and 
Nikolaev, 2012).  
The most common financial covenants are those based on net worth, working capital, leverage, 
interest coverage, and cash flow (Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Citron, 1992b; Gârleanu and Zwiebel, 
2009), though debt/EBITDA covenants are increasingly popular (Demiroglu and James, 2010). In a recent 
study, Demerjian (2011) suggests that from 1996 to 2007, the use of covenants based on balance sheet 
variables and ratios has declined compared with income statement ratios due to the broader adoption of 
fair value measurement by standard setters. However, Skinner (2011) questions this view, and 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) present conflicting evidence in a study of balance sheet (capital) and 
income and cash flow statement (performance) covenants. They show that as accounting becomes less 
informative (or contractible), capital covenants are preferred to performance covenants.  
An important question in this literature is whether or not debt contracts use GAAP numbers (Guay 
and Verrecchia 2006; Schipper, 2005). The evidence suggests that GAAP numbers are an important 
reference point, but that lenders often make adjustments to both to balance-sheet and particularly, income-
statement numbers. Indeed, observed measurement rules may differ markedly from GAAP. For example, 
net worth covenants are adjusted for subsequent equity build up (Beatty, Weber and Yu, 2008; Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002), and sometimes eliminate intangible assets (Citron, 1992b; Frankel, Seethamraju and 
Zach, 2008). Income-statement based covenants usually use adjusted earnings numbers such as EBIT or 
EBITDA that are more insulated from the effect of GAAP changes, while comprehensive income is 
hardly ever used (Li, 2010). There is also evidence that modifications are made to debt covenants when 
accounting rules change (Frankel et al., 2008) and higher interest rates are charged when contracts retain 
discretion to select amongst accounting treatments (Beatty et al., 2002). Overall, firms with more opaque 
accounting have more restrictive covenants (Chava et al., 2010), while firms with restated financial 
22 
 
statements agree to additional covenants in subsequent contracts to appease the concerns of lenders 
(Graham, Li and Qiu, 2008). Despite this, Citron (1992a) finds that banks impose few costs on borrowers 
when covenant breaches are caused by changes to accounting standards.  
The evidence on conservative adjustments leads to a fundamental question related to the 
development of the Conceptual Framework: Are there specific accounting measurement bases that 
improve debt contracting? If lenders prefer conservatism, they could in principal write conservative debt 
contracts, without requiring biased reporting. However, designing and monitoring these adjustments to 
standard debt contracts is costly and may require unaudited private information. The literature suggests a 
certain role for conservatism in contracting, generally suggesting improvements in contracting efficiency 
are associated with greater conservatism (Beatty et al., 2008; 2012; Caskey and Hughes, 2012; Nikolaev, 
2010; Vasvari, 2012).  
Accounting information, access to debt capital and the cost of debt 
Prior research also examines debt providers’ use of information by examining the association between 
financial reporting attributes, firm access to debt capital and the cost of debt. The fundamental prediction 
and finding in this literature is that firms making timely and informative disclosures are less likely to 
withhold bad news relevant to debt providers and as a result, can obtain better credit terms (e.g., 
Ashbaugh, Collins and LaFond, 2006; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005; Sengupta, 1998).
9
 This 
literature is thus based on the important premise that lenders consider borrowers’ accounting policies 
when estimating default risk. A related literature argues that debt-holders demand conservative 
accounting (Ball et al., 2008b; Watts, 2003a; 2003b) and explores the association between conservatism 
and debt financing. This literature predicts that conservatism, by requiring timely recognition of losses 
and deferred recognition of gains, reduces the cost of debt (Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris, 
2002; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008) and maximizes the ex ante probability of obtaining 
                                                 
9
 Armstrong et al. (2010) provide an excellent summary of this literature. 
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financing (Göx and Wagenhofer, 2009). In summary, the literature shows that credit markets rely heavily 
on accounting information for multiple purposes and their demands on the information reflect the nature 
of their claims. The extent to which their demands on accounting result in changes to GAAP figures (as 
opposed to resulting in post-reporting adjustments) remains a question of significant interest. 
3.5 Trade creditors 
As shown in Table 1, trade credit is a fundamental component of European firms’ financing. A 2006 
survey by the University of Leeds on 2,000 businesses in ten European countries, most EU companies sell 
their goods and services on credit (between 32 days - in Norway, to 110 days - in Greece) and experience 
late payments from customers (Intrum Justitia, 2011). Despite this, academic research into the 
information used by firms to extend trade credit is surprisingly scarce. Most of the evidence points to two 
principal conclusions. First, non-financial factors explain a significant portion of trade credit terms 
(Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen, 2011; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2011; Petersen & Rajan, 1994), 
giving little importance to accounting information accounting. Second, information intermediaries 
(particularly credit bureaus) play a key role in processing and sharing information about companies’ 
credit quality (Japelli and Pagano, 2002; Jones, 2010). Their ratings rely both on non-accounting 
information such as company visits and information from other firms that have extended credit to the 
company (Pertesen, 2004), and on financial statement data (Arrunada, 2011; Kallberg and Udell, 2003). 
Information use by credit managers 
Those who decide on the terms in a trade credit contract are credit managers or sales personnel, assisted 
by a credit bureau to assess credit risk according to Pike and Cheng (2003). A credit bureau is a formal 
exchange mechanism of credit information by lenders. The bureau collects and consolidates information 
about borrowers and in Europe, most credit bureaus also offer credit insurance. 
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Arrunada (2011) analyses the uses of information provided credit information services. Based on a 
large survey of users of an online credit information service, 90 per cent use the service to obtain 
information about SMEs, mainly for new clients (60 per cent) and for decisions about credit terms (67 per 
cent). Information sources relied upon to make these decisions are accounting information (83 per cent) 
and past history of judicial incidents (55 per cent).  
Once the new customer acceptance decision is made, credit terms are largely determined by non-
financial factors. Cheng and Pike (2003) argue that industry standards determine credit terms for UK 
firms, though Gill (2012) finds that credit terms are largely determined by firm-specific factors. Klapper 
et al. (2011) find that large, investment-grade buyers get long terms from small suppliers consistent with 
relatively untrusted suppliers extending longer terms to buyers to guarantee product quality. There is 
therefore little role for accounting information in setting credit terms. 
Information use by credit bureaus 
Credit bureaus play an essential role in Europe (and in the US). The most important credit bureaus in 
Europe are Euler Hermes, Atradius and COFACE (Jones, 2010). Their main role is the production of a 
comprehensive report that is sold to lenders (Kallberg and Udell, 2003). Both negative (defaults including 
the amounts of the outstanding at default and the date of last payment) and positive (credit history 
information on current and closed accounts) information appears in such reports. A condition for these 
items to be collected is that they are standardized, to permit storage in databases and use in subsequent 
analyses of default (Petersen, 2004). Credit providers use credit reports to conduct credit risk analysis of 
prospective borrowers in order to mitigate credit risk. 
Kallberg and Udell (2003) provide a rare empirical analysis of the information used by credit 
bureaus when issuing their reports. They find that the value of the information bureaus generate goes 
beyond information that is otherwise available to lenders, including information contained in borrowers’ 
financial statements. This suggests that if accounting information is a necessary ingredient for credit 
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bureaus it constitutes only a small part of the inputs actually used. Again these hint at the complementary 
role of financial accounting information in decision-making and its co-existence with other sources. 
 
4. Discussion of findings and conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to survey the evidence on the use of financial accounting information by 
capital providers of public interest entities across Europe. Based on this evidence, we reach four main 
conclusions.  
First, we document that capital providers are heterogeneous and that their information needs, as well 
as their demand for information, differ systematically. Information can be used to affect firm behaviour 
and cash flows via contractual arrangements (i.e., the stewardship role of accounting) and to value claims 
to reporting firms (i.e., the valuation role of accounting). While both accounting objectives yield similar 
information needs in some circumstances, theoretical studies identify areas where both objectives produce 
divergent information demands. To the extent that some capital providers have the opportunity to 
influence their contractual relationships with firms (i.e., inside investors, institutional outside investors 
and influential lenders), we can expect a significant demand for stewardship-related accounting 
information, while other investors (individual investors, public lenders, trade creditors) usually lack the 
opportunity to engage in contractual design. Their demand for financial accounting information can 
therefore be expected to be shaped predominantly by the valuation objective of financial accounting. 
Second, we find clear evidence that capital providers use multiple information sources and that these 
information sources interact. Institutional equity investors use financial accounting information 
predominantly as a verified, standardized and objective anchor to evaluate more timely (although less 
reliable) information from other sources. In addition, they use financial reporting to evaluate and 
discipline management when voluntarily providing additional information. Individual investors and trade 
creditors tend to use filtered information provided to them by information intermediaries, while private 
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lenders have access to information via direct communication channels. Nevertheless, the latter use audited 
financial reporting information extensively in contractual arrangements with borrowers. 
Third, direct, experimental and archival evidence clearly documents that investors tend to ignore or 
“miss-evaluate” relevant information. For example, even apparently benign presentational differences can 
have significant effects on capital providers’ decisions. While these behavioural aspects are extremely 
pronounced for individual investors, even professional equity investors seem to base their decisions on 
sub-optimal information and decision rules. This in turn implies that information-processing costs are 
relevant even for sophisticated capital providers. 
Fourth, we know surprisingly little about the actual information usage by capital providers. Direct 
evidence is scarce and many inferences are based on archival data that reflect aggregate investor 
behaviour and not their information gathering activities. The direct evidence that is available tends, to a 
large degree, to be dated and, in many instances, based on survey instruments and/or on artificial 
experimental settings. 
These findings have far-reaching implications for the current discussions surrounding the 
Conceptual Framework for financial reporting. The heterogeneity of users of financial accounting 
information makes it difficult to identify a dominant user group ex ante. On the other hand, since 
heterogeneous users have heterogeneous demands, the notion of ‘general purpose financial reporting’ 
seems questionable. Perhaps even more important, it seems unclear why financial accounting information 
should be designed to provide a holistic ‘true and fair view’ of the reporting entity. In a setting where 
capital providers use information from various sources for their decisions, it seems conceptually 
appealing to optimize financial accounting information conditional on the other information sources being 
available. Based on the literature, one can conclude that the competitive advantage of financial reporting 
information lies with its verifiability, objectivity, standardization and regularity. Finally, the observation 
that capital providers use information intermediaries and have limited information processing skills 
justifies further study into the recipients of financial accounting information as increasingly complex 
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accounting information induces substantial risks of miscommunication. To conclude, since different users 
have different information needs, information processing skills and alternative information sources, the 
development of a Conceptual Framework ultimately involves making political decisions. This implies that 
preferring the information need of one capital provider group over the information needs of other capital 
provides will imply distributional effects. 
For future research this review opens up a range of opportunities. First, there is a need for more 
recent direct evidence on the use of financial accounting information by different users for different 
objectives. Ideally, this evidence would be field-based. Alternative settings with similar information 
problems but easier access to information gathering activities for the researcher can be helpful. Second, 
our review highlights the need for refined theories about information usage in decision-making and 
contractual design. These models should reflect the observed information behaviour of the first step and 
incorporate information processing skills and bounded rationality of the economic agents. Third, the 
predictions of these models should be evaluated using experimental designs optimized for internal 
validity and real-life settings to gauge the external validity of the experimental findings. Fourth and 
finally, the evidence collected in the first three steps should help to provide ‘engineering’ support for 
standard setters who wish to establish, and maintain, a system of evidence-based financial accounting 
regulation. This process should help close the ‘communications gap’ (Singleton-Green, 2010) and may 
result in academic research being less underutilized by accounting standard setters and policy makers (cf. 
Trombetta et al., 2012).  
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Table 1   Capital providers of European firms 
Country 
 N 
 
Share- 
holders’ 
equity 
Non- 
current 
liabilitie
s 
Current 
liabilitie
s 
Trade creditors Debt Bank loans 
Debentures & 
convertible debt 
Lease liabilities 
% have % 
TL 
% 
have 
%  
TL 
% 
have 
%  
TL 
% 
have 
%  
TL 
% 
have 
%  
TL 
Austria 61 44.17% 24.92% 30.91% 100% 17% 85% 23% 59% 50% 20% 13% 39% 7% 
Belgium 87 45.51% 19.11% 35.38% 100% 25% 89% 23% 68% 53% 20% 11% 48% 14% 
Denmark 101 50.41% 19.08% 30.51% 99% 19% 84% 26% 57% 59% 11% 3% 27% 14% 
Finland 104 44.61% 20.27% 35.12% 99% 16% 92% 26% 76% 60% 23% 11% 61% 13% 
France 491 43.79% 18.94% 37.27% 100% 24% 90% 20% 59% 45% 21% 14% 38% 8% 
Germany 539 48.61% 21.55% 29.84% 98% 19% 71% 18% 52% 55% 13% 11% 25% 7% 
Greece 189 38.21% 22.82% 38.97% 99% 15% 87% 22% 50% 42% 0% 0% 35% 14% 
Ireland 50 53.24% 22.61% 24.15% 94% 21% 62% 22% 40% 58% 2% 0% 32% 14% 
Italy 174 35.12% 24.08% 40.81% 100% 27% 94% 22% 91% 89% 0% 0% 3% 1% 
Luxembourg 40 52.60% 24.07% 23.32% 95% 18% 85% 27% 50% 42% 5% 3% 45% 11% 
Netherlands 92 45.51% 18.87% 35.62% 99% 21% 77% 21% 42% 40% 10% 9% 30% 9% 
Portugal 33 26.63% 33.58% 39.79% 100% 16% 100% 35% 94% 74% 3% 1% 21% 3% 
Spain 100 34.43% 30.47% 35.09% 100% 20% 97% 30% 94% 81% 0% 0% 22% 3% 
Sweden 292 51.77% 15.85% 32.39% 100% 20% 66% 18% 44% 58% 12% 10% 14% 7% 
UK 1,065 57.28% 15.51% 27.20% 97% 23% 57% 16% 40% 57% 5% 5% 27% 15% 
All Countries 3,418 48.80% 19.24% 31.95% 98% 21% 74% 20% 53% 56% 10% 7% 28% 10% 
Notes: 
Table 1 provides average data on the capital structure of publicly listed, industrial EU15 firms that present consolidated accounts and have data available for the 
year ending December 2011 in the ORBIS database. We exclude firms if the total assets figure does not equal the sum of shareholders’ equity plus current and 
non-current liabilities, or if they have negative shareholders’ equity. The columns labeled ‘% have’ report the percentage of firms in a given country that have 
that type of liability. The columns labeled ‘% TL’ report the average percentage of that type of liability over the total liabilities of firms in that given country. 
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Table 2 Differences between public and private debt 
 Private debt Public debt 
Access to information High Low 
Ability to monitor the firm High Low 
Flexibility in resetting contract terms High Low 
Costs of renegotiating the contract Low High 
 
